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A MISSING LINK IN THE EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS
WALLACE MENDELSON*
On the eve of the American Revolution Blackstone could comment
that "so great.., is the regard of the [English] law for private prop-
erty ... it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for
the general good of the whole community."' A similar concern for
proprietary interests soon found expression on this side of the Atlantic
in what Professor Corwin has called "The Basic Doctrine of Ahmerican
Constitutional Law";2 namely, the "doctrine of vested interests." The
general purport of this concept was that "the effect of legislation on
existing property rights was a primary test of its validity.....-3
In brief a sense of insecurity among the comfortable classes in the
face of early American democracy led courts at first to invoke natural
law and social contract 4 principles for the insulation- of vested in-
terests from legislative regulation. But extra-constitutional restraints
upon government were hardly compatible with written constitutions.
For this and other reasons, after flirting with ex post facto5 and con-
tract clauses 6 and with the separation of powers7 , the doctrine of vested
interests finally settled in the law of the land or due process8 pro-
visions that were (and are) ubiquitous in American constitutions.
Granting all this as accepted learning, the present thesis is that
by the end of the eighteenth century the orthodox procedural meaning
of due process was too thoroughly established semantically, contextu-
ally9 and historically 10 to accommodate a radically new, i.e. substantive,
*Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES 139.
2. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REv. 247 (1914). See also Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REv. 366, 460 (1911).
3. CORWIq, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNmENT 72 (1948).
4. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386 (1798); Goshen v. Stonington,
4 Conn. 209, 225 (1822).
5. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798); cf. Satterlee v. Mat-
thewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 415 (1829) (note appended to Mr. Justice John-
son's opinion).
6. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); cf. Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
7. See Lewis v. Webb, 3 Maine 326 (1825); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C.
(1 Mar.) 42 (1787); Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C. 252 (1792); Staniford v.
Barry, 1 Aik. 314 (Vt. 1825).
8. The term "law of the land" is a literal translation from the original
Magna Charta. In later versions, i.e. reissues, the term becomes "due process
of law." By Coke's time the two phrases had become interchangeable. See 2
COKE, INSTITUTES 50-51. In general our earliest constitutions contained
the former expression while later usage tended to adopt the latter.
9. In our Federal Bill of Rights and in all of the early state constitutions
"due process" and "law of the land" clauses are found in the midst of purely
procedural provisions.
10. See, e.g., 2 KENT, COmmENTARIES ON AmERIcAN LAW 13 (14th ed. 1896);
2 STORY, CONSTITUTION § 1789 (3d ed. 1858). Professor Strong, running counter
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meaning without some respectable constitutional go-between; namely,
the separation of powers. Professor Corwin was well aware of the
importance of separation principles in the development of the doc-
trine of vested interests." But neither he nor his followers appear to
have noticed the importance of those principles in the metamorphosis
of due process.12 The burden of the present effort is to show how that
ancient procedural concept got its initial substantive impetus by ab-
sorbing separation of powers ideas-an impetus great enough to carry
on eventually without recourse to separation doctrine. So viewed the
latter was a vital link in the evolution of due process, not merely one
of several fumbling steps that were tried and found wanting before
vested interests finally found sanctuary in the fourteenth amendment.
To put it shortly orthodox due process meant that government could
not punish, or "go against," a person except in a procedurally proper
manner. Of course certain powers and processes belong to legislatures
and others to the courts. In the old phraseology "To . . . compare the
claims of the parties with the laws of the land before established, is in
its nature a judicial act. But to ... pass new rules for the regulation
of new controversies, is in its nature, a legislative act; and if those
rules interfere with the past, or the present, and do not look wholly
to the future, they violate the definition of a law, 'as a rule of civil
conduct'; because no rule of conduct can with consistency operate upon
what occurred before the rule itself was promulgated.' 3 Moreover
while courts are created to apply the law retrospectively to particular
persons in particular circumstances, the legislative function is to make
"general and public law [of future application] equally binding upon
every member of the community * * * under similar circumstances.' 4
to what he admits is the accepted view, undertakes to show that there were
some threads of substantive meaning in due process in England prior to the
Glorious Revolution and also in Colonial America. See STRONG, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43-49, 307 (1950).
11. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REV. 247, 259 (1914).
12. In a recent recapitulation of his previous efforts Professor Corwin
appends a short footnote to his discussion of an early due process case to
say, "It will be observed again how the principle of the separation of powers
helps out this [due process?] argument," namely, that "when anybody is
cleprived of his conceded property rights . . . it is with a view to punishing
him, which can only be done by judicial-i.e., 'due'-process .... " CoRWIN,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 93 (1948). Interested in a much broader prob-
lem, Professor Corwin thus casually passes over the relationship which is
the crux of the present paper. Indeed it is not clear to me that even the above
quoted remarks refer to the connection between due process and separation.
For his word "again" is supported by reference to another page where clearly
Professor Corwin is not talking about due process at all, but rather about the
connection between separation and the doctrine of vested interests. See also
text and note 60 infra.
13. Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 204 (1818). See also Ogden v. Black-
ledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 277 (1804); Opinion of the Judges, 4 N.H. 565,
572 (1829).
14. Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 259, 270 (1829). See also Holden v. James,
11 Mass. 396 (1814).
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(Emphasis added.) Accordingly if a legislature acts not in general
and prospective terms, but retrospectively for a particular case, it
encroaches upon the judicial process. This is the old problem of at-
tainder and bills of pains and penalties. One whose vested right is
disturbed by such "legislation" is hurt (punished) as the result of
improper procedure. In striking it down a court merely enforces
process requirements-though the substance of the measure is in-
cidentally destroyed. This approach was especially relevant in the
formative era of American law when, as Dean Pound has shown, legis-
latures deemed themselves "omnicompetent" even in the judicial do-
main. They "did not hesitate to enact statutes reversing judgments
of the courts in particular cases. They sought to probate wills re-
jected by the courts .... By special laws they directed the details of
local government for particular instances. They validated particular
invalid marriages. They suspended the statute of limitations for a
particular litigant in a particular case. They exempted a particular
wrongdoer from liability for a particular wrong for which his neigh-
bors would be held by the general law."' 5 Such measures of special
rather than general, and retrospective rather than prospective, appli-
cation smack of the judicial decree. Some of them in essence are
legislative adjudications. In disturbing vested rights they would be
procedurally vulnerable for taking property by improper process,
being among other things a repudiation of trial by jury and in effect
bills of pains and penalties.
This problem and the separation approach to it are illustrated as
early as 1787 in Bayard v. Singleton.16 There, after confiscating by
special act the land of certain royalists, the North Carolina legislature
provided that actions for the recovery of such property should be
dismissed by the courts upon motion. After some outside observations
by Ashe, J.,17 concerning the separation of powers, the court re-
fused to honor the dismissal statute, observing according to the re-
porter:
That by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a
decision of his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legislature
could take away this right, and require him to stand condemned in his
property without a trial, it might with as much authority require his
life to be taken away without a trial by jury .... 18
Soon thereafter Magna Charter (Due Process?) was introduced into
the formula. In Bowman v. Middleton'9 a South Carolina statute,
15. PouNd, THE FoimwATmr ERA OF AMRicAN LAW 39-40 (1950).
16. 1 N.C. (1 Mar.) 42 (1787).
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id. at 45.
19. 1 S.C. 252 (1792).
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purporting to quiet title by confirming the claim of one of the con-
testants, was held invalid on the ground that:
[P]laintiffs could claim no title under the act in question, as it was
against common right, as well as against magna charta, to take away the
freehold of one man and vest it in another, and that, too, to the prejudice
of third persons, without any compensation, or even a trial by the jury
of the country, to determine the right in question.20
Skipping for the moment some twenty-seven years brings us to
the celebrated argument of Daniel Webster as counsel for Dartmouth
College. His case was before the Supreme Court on federal question
(contract clause) grounds which precluded consideration of state con-
stitutional restraints. 21 Recognizing "the limits which bound the
jurisdiction of the Court," Webster observed nevertheless that "it may
assist in forming an opinion of [the] true nature and character [of
the statutes altering Dartmouth's charter] to compare them with those
fundamental principles, introduced into State governments for the
purpose of limiting the exercise of legislative power .... 22
One prohibition [Art. 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution] is
"that no person shall be deprived of his property . . . but by judgment
of his peers, or the law of the land"....
Have the plaintiffs lost their franchises by "due course and due process
of law?" On the contrary, are not these acts "particular acts of the
legislature, which have no relation to the community in general, and
which are rather sentences than laws?" By the law of the land, is most
clearly intended, the general law; a law, which hears before it con-
demns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which
govern society. Everything which may pass under the form of an
enactment, is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land. If this
were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation,
acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate
to another, legislative judgments, decrees and forfeitures, in all possible
forms, would be the law of the land.23
In support of this argument that a legislature's performance of quasi-
judicial acts is a violation of "the law of the land" and due process
Webster cited University v. Foy.24 There legislation purported to
repeal an earlier grant of land to the university. Striking down the
repealing measure the North Carolina Supreme Court had said:
20. Id. at 254.
21. Webster was uneasy about going to "Washington on a single point" and
took steps to broaden his base in later litigation should he lose on the federal
issue. 1 FuEss, DANIEL WEBSTER 225 (1930).
22. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 557-58 (1819).
It is, of course, interesting and perhaps significant that the Court permitted
such argument.
23. Id. at 561, 581.
24. 5N .C. 58 (1805).
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But one great and important reason which influences us in deciding
this question is [the constitutional provision] "that no freeman ought to
be . .. deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the
land".... It seems to us to warrant a belief that members of a corpora-
tion as well as individuals shall not be so deprived ... unless by a trial
by Jury in a Court of Justice, according to the known and established
rules of decision .... The property vested in the Trustees must remain
for the uses intended for the University, until the Judiciary of the
country in the usual and common form, pronounce them guilty of such
acts, as will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their rights or a dissolution
of their body.
25
The other case cited by Webster on this point was Dash v. Van
Kleeck26 in which both Thompson, J., and the great Kent, C. J., had
used the separation of powers as a cloak to protect vested interests
against legislative interference. 27 And they in turn had cited Ogden v.
Blackledge28 in which the Supreme Court of the United States had,
as Kent put it, "considered the point too plain for argument, that a
statute could not retrospect, so as to take away a vested civil right.
'29
The supererogatory argument referred to began as follows:
To declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to de-
clare what the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental prin-
ciples of all our governments is that the legislative power shall be
separated from the judicial.30
The full significance of Webster's position can be appreciated only
in contrast to the opinion below. There the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in then orthodox fashion had categorically rejected an
unqualified substantive due process argument:
What statute does not either directly or indirectly interfere with
property rights? The principle urged would probably make our whole
statute book a dead letter.3 1
Webster's genius was that he saw in separation a device for giving due
process a manageable, if expanded, meaning in an age not yet pre-
pared to recognize only the sky as its limit. No court in 1819 could
be expected to hold, and few lawyers to argue, that due process em-
bodied (as Holmes later put it) Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Dy-
namics, or anything like it. But imaginative lawyers could see that a
court might be induced to give the old provision such familiar,
quasi-procedural overtones as were implicit in separation and the old
struggle against bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.
25. Id. at 87, 88, 89.
26. 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).
27. Id. at 497-98, 507-08.
28. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804).
29. 7 Johns. at 507-08.
30. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 277.
31. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 131 (1818).
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Once this step was accomplished more expansive constructions might
be in order!
Of course for jurisdictional reasons the Supreme Court in the
Dartmouth case could not make use of a "law of the land" or "due
process" clause, but a famous lawyer had made a point in a forum
where all judges and lawyers could take notice of it. Within a dec-
ade the Tennessee Supreme Court, perhaps fastening upon Webster's
emphasis on generality as a necessary characteristic of legislation, had
started a line of cases the crux of which was that special or "partial"
laws directly or indirectly interfering with property rights violate "the
law of the land" clause of the state constitution.32 In due course
the Tennessee court made more plain-what doubtless was implicit
from the beginning-that while talking "law of the land," it was think-
ing separation.
33
Meanwhile amalgamation of separation and due process had been
accomplished in the jurisprudence of states far more influential in
the legal world than Tennessee. When South Carolina tried to create
a new medical school by transferring the "rights, powers and duties"
of an existing institution to a new one, it met a "law of the land"
barrier in State v. Heyward.34 There, after noting that while in Eng-
land Parliament was supreme, in South Carolina the separation of
powers prevailed, the court said:
An Act of the Legislature which takes from one man his property, or
rights, and gives it, or them, to another, on a claim of right, is the exercise
of Judicial power, which is [vested in the judiciary] * * * the State ...
cannot resume her grant, or transfer it to another, until a forfeiture of the
grant is judicially ascertained. . . . It would hence seem that . . . a
corporation can only be deprived of its powers, rights, privileges, and
immunities by a judgment of forfeiture, obtained according to the law
of the land.-By this, I understand a trial had, and a judgment pro-
nounced, in the court of law of this State.35 (Emphasis added.)
In the following year (1833) Chief Justice Ruffin in Hoke v. Hender-
son 36 delivered the classic separation-due process opinion. By general
act North Carolina had made certain public offices elective rather
than appointive as they had been previously. The effect was to deprive
Hoke of an appointive position. Finding that Hoke had had a property
right in his office, the Chief Justice for his court held that
Whenever an act of Assembly therefore is a decision of titles between
individuals, or classes of individuals, although it may in terms purport
to be the introduction of a new rule of title, it is essentially a judgment
against the old claim of right; which is not a legislative, but a judicial
32. Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 259, 270-71 (1829).
33. Jones v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 71-80 (1836).
34. 15 S.C. 389 (1832).
35. Id. at 410, 412.
36. 15 N.C. 1 (1833).
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function.... The Legislature cannot act in that character; and therefore,
although their act has the forms of law, it is not one of those laws
of the land, by which alone a freeman can be deprived of his property.37
In the original edition of his Commentaries on American Law in
1826 Kent had defined due process in what appears to be purely ortho-
dox, procedural terms: "it means law in its regular course of adminis-
tration through the courts of justice."' 38 In the editions that appeared
after Hoke's case Kent added a footnote to the above definition in which
he commended Ruffin's "elaborate opinion" as being "replete with
sound constitutional doctrines." So indorsed in the Commentaries Hoke
v. Henderson was insured a wide circulation. Under the authority of
such great names as Ruffin and Kent it could not fail to carry enormous
weight.
Within a decade Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania in Norman v.
Heist,39 without citing any of the foregoing cases, wrote an opinion in
which he came to similar conclusions:
[T]he Constitution ... declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his
life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law
of the land. What law? Undoubtedly, a pre-existent rule of conduct,
declarative of a penalty for a prohibited act; not an ex post facto rescript
or decree made for the occasion. The design of the convention was to
exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government; and there
would be no exclusion of it, if such rescripts or decrees were allowed
to take effect in the form of a statute.40
Thus a full generation before adoption of the fourteenth amendment
three of the four leading ante-bellum state court judges, Kent, Ruffin
and Gibson, had put their stamps of approval upon the absorption of
the separation concept by due process.
41
Professor Corwin considers the "great case of Wynehamer v. State
of New York 42 ... a new starting point in the history of [substantive]
due process .... ,"43 The difficulty with this evaluation is that in hold-
ing a prohibition act invalid on due process grounds the court empha-
sized the failure of the measure to distinguish between "liquors existing
when it took effect as a law, and such as might thereafter be acquired
... all the judges [being] of opinion that it would be competent for
the Legislature to pass such an act [that] should be plainly and dis-
37. Id. at 13, 15.
38. 2 KENT, COMMENTARES ON AMERICAN LAW 13 (14th ed. 1896).
39. 5 W. & S. 171 (Pa. 1843).
40. Id. at 173. See also Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
41. Chief Justice Shaw comes quite close to this position in Commonwealth
v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 102-04 (1851). Earlier in Holden v. James,
11 Mass. 396 (1814), a special, retrospective statute had been invalidated via a
constitutional clause similar to the more common due process provision.
42. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
43. See CoRwiN, LiBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 101-02 (1948).
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tinctly prospective as to the property on which it should operate."44
Thus like all of the cases discussed above Wynehamer turns on the
judicial, i.e., particular or retrospective, nature of the legislation in
question.
Perhaps a better candidate for a "new starting point" in substantive
due process would be the earlier New York case of Taylor v. Porter.45
There relying on Hoke v. Henderson and the later of the two Tennessee
cases referred to above, Bronson, J., for his court struck down a general
act authorizing, under limited circumstances, the construction of
private roads on property owned by third parties.
The meaning of the [law of the land] section then seems to be, that
no member of the state shall be . . . deprived of any of his rights or
privileges, unless the matter shall be adjudged against him upon trial
had according to the course of the common law. It must be ascertained
judicially that he has forfeited his privileges, or that some one else has
a superior title to the property he possesses, before either of them can be
taken from him. It cannot be done by mere legislation. 46
While the language used is much like that in the earlier cases (fusing
separation and due process concepts) there is no specific mention of
retroactivity or particularity. In fact the act at issue was general in
nature and the reported facts suggest that it long ante-dated plaintiff's
acquisition of the property for which he claimed and received pro-
tection.47 It is noteworthy that in this case Judge Bronson's language
was not endorsed by his colleagues. One of them concurred separately
without opinion, the other dissented.
The suggestion that Taylor v. Porter marks a new departure comes
simply to this: in all prior cases the retrospective or "partial" appli-
cation of the challenged legislation had been emphasized as the basis
of invalidity. When Bronson, J., silently dispensed with both of these
elements he was in effect holding-perhaps without awareness of what
was involved-that separation was no longer the essential content of
due process in vested interest cases. For the elements of retroactivity
and particularity are important only when it is deemed necessary to
show the judgment-like, or "pains and penalties" quality, of a legisla-
44. 13 N.Y. at 487 (1856). See text and note 60 infra.
45. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843). Cf. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) in which
substantive due process in the modern sense first reached full and unequivocal
bloom.
46. 4 Hill at 146.
47. See dissenting opinion of Nelson, C. J., 4 Hill at 148-51. Professor Corwin
at first mistakenly read Taylor v. Porter as involving only a special, or private,
statute. See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil
War, 24 HARv. L. REV. 366, 460, 465 (1911). On that basis of course there would
be nothing unusual about the case. In his recapitulation thirty-seven years
later Professor Corwin apparently recognized his mistake as to the nature
of the statute in question. See CORwiN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 97-98
(1948). But meanwhile, thanks to his earlier efforts, Wynehamer had become
such a famous landmark that there was perhaps no retreating from it.
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ture's act. If Bronson, J., could do without either or the old crutches,
it is noteworthy that Ruffin, C. J., in Hoke's case had expressly dis-
pensed with one of them, namely, particularity.48 Consciously or not
Judge Bronson was clearly ahead of his own court and ahead of his
era.
In the only pre-Civil War majority opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in which due process was substantively conceived
both the special and the retrospective nature of the legislation at issue
were stressed.49 Congress by special act had extended the life of a
patent on planing machines. Bloomer v. McQuewan5° raised the ques-
tion of whether an assignee under the original patent continued to
enjoy his assigned rights under the extension. Construing the statute
so as not to "interfere with rights of property before acquired."51
Chief Justice Taney for the Court observed that, if the measure were
construed otherwise,
the power of Congress to pass it would be open to serious objection ....
The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased
and paid for .... They were the property of the respondents. Their only
value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress, passed after-
wards, depriving the appellees of the right to use them, certainly could
not be regarded as due process of law.52
So much for the ante-bellum cases. If not universally recognized, so
well established was the nexus between separation and due process
on the eve of the Civil War that the two could be presented in Sedg-
wick's well-known treatise as virtual equivalents. Thus, referring to
the separation of powers, Sedgwick continues:
This idea is sometimes conveyed in the phrase . . . that a legislature
can do no judicial act; and it is almost identical with the constitutional
declaration which insures to all persons attacked or charged, the protec-
tion of the law of the land. If, as we have seen, by the right to the law
48. See Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1, 13 (1833). Rejecting a broad due
process argument in 1854 the Supreme Court of Illinois observed, "The framers
of Magna Charta and of the constitutions of the United States and of the
states never intended to modify, abridge, or destroy the police powers of
government. They only prohibited its exercize by ex post facto [i.e. retro-
spective] laws and regulated the mode of trial for offences." Goddard v.
Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 589 (1854).
49. I have passed over two minority opinions, one per Mr. Justice Baldwin
in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 510-15 (1841); the other per
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450
(1856), in which due process is used in a purely substantive sense without re-
liance upon separation factors. In view of what went before and after, these
must be considered sports. The fact that both deal with slavery suggests that
they are the product of the abolitionists' peculiar political usage. See Graham,
Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40
CALIF. L. REv. 483 (1952); Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Backgrounds of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 610.
50. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
51. Id. at 554.
52. Id. at 553.
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of the land is meant the right to judicial procedure, investigation, and
determination, whenever life, liberty, or property is attacked; and if it
be conceded, as it must be, that our legislatures are by our fundamental
law prohibited from doing any judicial acts,-then it would seem . . .
that the rights of the citizens are as perfectly protected by the guarantee
of the law of the land, as they can be by a preemptory distribution of
power. In fact, the special clause works a division of power. . . . This,
however, is merely a circuitous statement of the proposition that vested
rights are sacred.53 (Emphasis added.)
After the Civil War the Supreme Court's first brush with substan-
tive due process came in Hepburn v. Griswold.&5 4 There, striking down
national legal tender legislation on due process grounds interalia,
Chief Justice Chase for his Court emphasized the retrospective char-
acter of the offending measure.5 5 Shortly afterwards counsel first used
the fourteenth amendment to press the unqualified, i.e., non-separa-
tion, substantive position upon the Court in the Slaughter House
cases.56 The response was a categorical repudiation. Indeed the Court
had never heard of such a claim.
We are not without judicial interpretation ... both State and National,
of the meaning of this clause. And it is sufficient to say that under no
construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we
deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State . . . upon the
exercise of their trade by the butchers . . . be held to be a deprivation
of property within the meaning of that provision. 57
But counsel's position found support in dissenting opinions by Justices
Bradley and Swayne.58 Both of them, however, rested more heavily
upon the "privileges and immunities" clause than on due process. But
this emphasis was soon to be reversed. The "privileges and immuni-
ties" of citizenship proviso perhaps was too slender a tool in the
expanding world of corporate enterprise, or was it that due process
was a more familiar, and hence handier, instrument thanks to its
long tempering in the flames of separation doctrine at the state level?
In any case we know that only a few months after rejecting a purely
substantive due process argument in the Slaughter House cases, a
majority in Bartemeyer v. Iowa,59 sustaining a prohibition act, cited
Wynehamer with the observation that, if the prosecution had involved
the sale of liquor owned prior to prohibition, it would have raised
"very grave" due process questions.60 The narrowness of this separa-
53. SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 676-77 (1857). See also
DWARRIS, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 165, 428 (Potter ed. 1874).
54. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
55. Id. at 624-25.
56. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
57. Id. at 80-81.
58. Id. at 111, 124 (Mr. Justice Field's dissent does not mention due process).
59. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873).
60. Id. at 133. Professor Corwin calls this reasoning an "evasion" of the
true issue which again suggests that he was oblivious to the role of separa-
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tion concession to due process was emphasized in the following year
when, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Court (as he had in the
two preceding cases), struck down a tax measure on the basis of
"limitations which grow out of the essential nature of all free govern-
ments."61 This atavistic reliance upon "natural law" must have amused
Justices Field, Swayne and Bradley, but it certainly did not impede the
fight to put the heady brew in the old "due process" bottle.62 Perhaps
they remembered that extra-constitutional limitations without more
had long since been tried and found wanting.
63
After a long and cautious flirtation with the Field-Swayne-Bradley
position,64 the Court finally in the Minnesota Rate case of 189065 took
what is generally considered the decisive turn.6 6 But, it is noteworthy
that the challenged rate order of a regulatory commission in this case
was not found to be unreasonable or confiscatory. Rather the holding
was that, since under the authorizing statute the commission's order
was final, the railroad had been denied a judicial hearing on the rea-
sonableness of the rate which is "eminently a question for judicial in-
vestigation, requiring due process of law for its determination.
6 7
Here again is a resort to "separation of powers" help for giving con-
tent to due process.
Not until six years later in Missouri Pacific Ry v. Nebraska 8 does
one find a Supreme Court majority invalidating legislation on non-
procedural due process grounds without reliance upon some element
of separation.69 The highest court of the land had now caught up with
tion in the rise of substantive due process. CoRWn, LImRTY AGAINST GovERN-
MENT 128 (1948). If there is evasion here, what of Wynehamer?
61. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874).
62. See Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION
RECONSIDERED (Read. ed. 1938).
63. See, e.g,, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798).
64. While sustaining challenged legislation, the Court made linguistic con-
cessions in each of the following: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 134 (1876);
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877); Stone v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661
(1887); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
65. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
66. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,
600, 609 (1942).
67. 134 U.S. at 458.
68. 164 U.S. 403 (1896). After Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1869), the fifth amendment's due process clause first drew blood in Noble
v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893), in which separation
elements are prominent.
69. The following extract from a letter written by Mr. Justice Miller in
1875 suggests what happened on the bench between Slaughter House and
the principal case:
"It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar the advocates
for forty years of railroad companies, and all the forms of associated
capital, when they are called upon to decide cases where such interests
are in contest. All their training, all their feelings are from the start
in favor of those who need no such influence. I am losing interest in these
matters. I will do my duty but will ftght no more. I am perhaps beginning
1956 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Judge Bronson. A long cycle in the evolution of due process had been
fulfilled. But after the Missouri Pacific denouement what content
was due process to have in vested interest cases? If separation was no
longer to be its essence what would be? For neither language, nor
context, nor history provide a touchstone when the ancient term is
freed both of its procedural and separation moorings.70 This, of course,
is a classic riddle of American constitutional law. The first answer-
for their have been many-came only months after the Missouri Pacif-
ic case. Laissez-faire had long been in the air. At least since the
Civil War it had been the real stimulant, the substance behind the
separation-due process form of protection for vested interests. In
Allgeyer v. Louisiana7l "liberty of contract" formally moved into the
"void of due process" as separation faded out. The immediate foun-
tainhead of this development, as Dean Pound has shown, was Mr.
Justice Field's separate opinion a few years earlier in Butcher's Union
Co. v. Cresent City Co.72 Rejected by the highest court of the land,
Field's position was treated in the more "advanced" New York, and
other state, courts as of the highest authority. 3 Having been farmed
out and proven in the minor leagues, so to speak, "liberty of contract"
was taken up in the unanimous Allgeyer opinion by Mr. Justice Peck-
ham who himself had come up from New York. Then, after all but
wrecking the Supreme Court, the "liberty of contract" yardstick gave
way to others. Indeed there have been so many others that it is quite
plain the true measure of substantive due process is the length of the
judge's foot. And there's the rub!
To summarize: Separation with its procedural connotations had
been a ready, if narrow, bridge between orthodox procedural due
process and the doctrine of vested interests in an age when legislatures
habitually interfered with property by crude retrospective and special,
i.e., quasi-judicial, measures. But as legislation entered the broad
police power domain (and showed more respect for the line between
court and legislature) protection that hinged on separation offered
little comfort for the claims of property. And so, having accomplished
their intermediary purpose, the separation elements in due process
were gradually abandoned in favor of principles better fitted to the
needs of a new age. What remained constant in the transition from
separation to laissez-faire as the nub of due process was substantive
to experience that loss of interest in many things which is the natural
result of years. . . ." FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREMIE
COURT 1862-1890, 374 (1939).
70. Traces of the mingling of separation and due process may be found as
late as 1936, i.e., as long as substantive due process lived in the realm of
economic affairs. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311-12 (1936)
and cases cited therein.
71. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
72. 111 U.S. 746, 754 (1884).
73. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 470 (1909).
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protection for established proprietary interests. As usual, with judge-
made law changing social pressures were accommodated, not by the
sudden introduction of strange, new concepts, but by subtle, usually
imperceptible, changes in the meaning of old, familiar principles.7 4
74. See PouND, THE Spnm-T OF THE COMMON LAW 166-92 (1921).
